Measuring the effects of U.S. tariffs: a comparison among major trading partners
Published by Simone Zambelli. .
United States of America Export Europe Economic policy Foreign market analysis
After analyzing in the article Are Trump’s tariffs really reshaping EU exports? the impact of the new tariff measures on European exports to the United States, this second contribution focuses on the other major suppliers of the American market: China, Canada, Mexico, Brazil and India, in addition to the European Union.
The new “reciprocal” tariff rates introduced by the U.S. administration, which add to specific sectoral measures, vary significantly across partners: 15% for the EU, 25% for Mexico, 34% for China, 35% for Canada and up to 50% for Brazil and India. These are high levels, capable of significantly affecting the competitiveness of exported products and altering global value chains.
An overview for the January–September 2025 period
Already in the first nine months of 2025, before the full implementation of the tariffs, export dynamics towards the U.S. reveal a fragmented picture, where some countries appear more penalized than others.
Tab.1 – Exports to the U.S. (first 9 months of 2025)
(% changes at constant prices)
| Products | China | Canada | Mexico | Brazil | India | EU |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exempt* (e.g. pharmaceuticals, semiconductors ...) |
-29.4 | -0.3 | 51.5 | -2.6 | 65.7 | 33.7 |
| Automotive | -47.7 | -8.4 | 3.8 | 10.5 | -50.9 | -18.8 |
| Automotive components | -27.5 | 2.0 | 35.8 | 31.5 | 11.8 | -1.3 |
| Industrial raw materials (steel, aluminum, copper and derivatives) |
-12.0 | -12.1 | -3.0 | 2.4 | 17.6 | 5.6 |
| Other (e.g. agri-food, fashion, home goods ...) |
-15.2 | -5.1 | 0.0 | -2.1 | 2.0 | 0.7 |
A comprehensive assessment of the first nine months shows clearly the significant penalization of China, which records sharp real contractions across all clusters.
This pattern reflects the ongoing U.S.–China confrontation and the evolving tariff structure applied during the year, which in April–May reached levels above 120% before being reduced.
At the sectoral level, Chinese automotive exports to the U.S. fall by 47.7%, while automotive components drop by almost 30%. Industrial raw materials decline by 12%, and even exempt goods — such as pharmaceuticals and semiconductors — contract by 29.4%. The broad-based downturn appears to reflect a further acceleration of the U.S.–China “decoupling” process, initiated during Trump’s first administration.
Canada, by contrast, shows overall resilience. The largest decline is found in exports of Industrial Raw Materials (-12.1%), partly due to the country’s role as a major supplier of steel and aluminum.
Conversely, Mexico significantly strengthens its market position, posting substantial growth across several segments and confirming its role as an integral part of North American value chains.
Among emerging economies, Brazil shows widespread but moderate growth, while India appears particularly dynamic.
A particularly relevant comparison is with the European Union: overall, during January–September, EU export performance remains highly resilient relative to the other major suppliers of the U.S. market.
At this point, it is useful to assess how exports of the main partners evolved after the introduction of tariffs.
An overview following the introduction of tariff measures
Tab.2 – Exports to the U.S. after tariff implementation
(% changes at constant prices)
| Products | China | Canada | Mexico | Brazil | India | EU |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exempt* (e.g. pharmaceuticals, semiconductors ...) |
– | – | – | – | – | – |
| Automotive | -70.0 | -12.4 | 3.0 | 22.8 | -35.2 | -30.2 |
| Automotive components | -38.7 | -2.4 | 36.6 | 45.8 | 18.9 | -2.9 |
| Industrial raw materials (steel, aluminum, copper and derivatives) |
-16.7 | -16.1 | -3.7 | -6.3 | 18.6 | 7.2 |
| Other (e.g. agri-food, fashion, home goods ...) |
-23.9 | -9.6 | 0.9 | -3.5 | 1.5 | -1.0 |
The comparison between the EU and other major players once again confirms the strong resilience of EU exporters, with notable stability in Industrial Raw Materials and Other Manufactured Goods (Agri-food, Fashion, Machinery, etc.).
Significant losses emerge in the Automotive sector, where — besides the sharp Chinese decline — the drops recorded by India and even Canada (despite exemptions for USMCA-compliant products) are also noteworthy.
Brazil, meanwhile, records unexpected and sharply contrasting growth in automotive and components, which may reflect localized U.S.-linked production within the country.
Conclusions
Overall, the data show that the new U.S. tariffs have not produced a broad or deep impact on exports to the United States. Effects appear concentrated in specific countries and sectors, while most trade partners exhibit notable adaptability.
The only real exception is China (and, to a lesser extent, Canada), which experiences sharp contractions across nearly all sectors — from automotive to components, consumer goods and raw materials. For other countries, variations remain contained or even positive.